Israel-Gaza and the Potential for Protracted War in 2014.

'The Palestine issue is separate from the problems in Iraq and Syria, which are making the headlines today, but it continues to spread its poison.Israel wants demilitarisation of Gaza; Hamas wants the blockade ended. Neither objective is realistic'. Oliver Miles

The Israel Gaza War of 2014 is part of an older continuity of conflict dating back to 1948. What has made in potentially intractable is the wrangle over the fate of the Gaza Marine offshore gas reserves and the threat Hamas could pose to Israel's national energy security.

Hamas today claims to have fired two rockets at Israel's gas rigs in the Noa field, one reason Israel is adamant the naval blockade would not be lifted until the Gaza Strip is demilitarised. Israel fears that not only rockets but boats could be used to try to attack its offshore gas infrastructure.

Israel and Egypt face an energy crisis and the defeat of Hamas is considered apiece with the coup in Egypt in 2013 and crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood so as to preserve the joint security nexus upon which 'stability' and economic growth could continue. Egypt is, at present, enduring regular power cuts.

Israeli gas from the Tamar gas field is due to be exported to Egypt but, as Simon Henderson points out, fears remain that Hamas operatives or rocket attacks could pose a threat. The US corporation Noble Energy signed a $60bn contract to pump gas to Egypt a few hours ago.

Egypt needs Israeli gas to avert continued power cuts, having used up much of its domestic gas through sales to Israel for under the market price, one reason for both the fuel crisis and the revolt against Mubarak in 2011. This is why Egyptian peace terms have offered Hamas little.

Hamas claimed in the ceasefire talks that giving up the armed jihad was 'inconceivable' but for Israel the time to get what Netanyahu terms 'sustainable peace' has never been better. Iran no longer supports Hamas due to tensions over the Syrian conflict and the fact Hizbollah is fighting the Muslim Brotherhood

So one reason Israel could pursue a military solution to Hamas is that Hamas only has Qatar as its sole ally when Qatar is also a Western ally and the Western Powers are embroiled in trying to stop the spread of IS. The Free Syria Army and Muslim Brotherhood are no longer much of a force in Syria.

From 2007, Israel had to take Hamas into account as regards Gaza gas. With Fatah and Hamas at war with each other because Hamas was resentful that 'their' gas was going to benefit Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, Israel could hope to detach the two areas of Palestine to impose its way.

One reason was that there was a view that Gazan gas could not be used to enrich Hamas because of its potential to fund terrorist activity against Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon made the dilemma plain in a memorandum written in 2007,

"It is clear that without an overall military operation to uproot Hamas control of Gaza, no drilling work can take place without the consent of the radical Islamic movement.”

On top of that the struggle to control the gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean and energy routes explain why the international powers,-the US, Russia and the EU-and regional powers have not been able to come together and mediate effectively so as to provide a way out of crisis as it reaches an impasse.

The EU aligns with Israel because it would seek to benefit from Eastern Mediterranean gas in order to diversify supplies away from depending on Russia. With Libya in turmoil and Qatari supplies of LNG potentially menaced by Iranian control of the Straights of Hormuz, Israeli gas would be a boon.

With Russia vying for a stake in exploiting the Gaza Marine gas, the EU and US would prefer Israel to be in charge of exploiting the gas, so that it could help the EU reduce dependence upon Russia through importing gas via Cyprus, the PA has been trying to strike deals with Gazprom.

A European Parliament report in April made this clear,

“Global actors are ready to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean [gas field’s] strategic implications..Russia aims to safeguard its gas monopoly, the United States to support its business interest, and Europe to increase its energy security and reduced dependence on Russia in light of the Crimea crisis.”

The report states, that the EU should “back the strategic triangle of Israel, Cyprus and Turkey as a first step towards the construction of an Eastern Mediterranean energy corridor.” The reason for the lack of EU pressure on Israel or attempts to mediate is due to energy concerns.

A protracted war could be on its way.

Why the Stop the War Coalition in Britain is Orwellian.

'The terrible plight of the Yazidis, trapped by Isis and fearing a terrible fate if captured, is heart-rending but will not be helped by further military intervention in Iraq. The occupation of Iraq broke the infrastructure of Iraqi society. Sectarian tensions were encouraged and exacerbated by the occupying forces, and some of those now supporting Isis formed the opposition to this occupation'.

So opines Lindsey German, head and chief propagandist of Britain's Stop the War Coalition. Of course, if the war being waged by ISIS in Iraq at present is considered a continuation of the war the US and Britain started in 2003 by invading Iraq then there is not really much more to say on it. Only there is.

Some of those now aligning with ISIS were indeed part of the 'opposition' to the US and UK occupation. Former Baathists and Sunni jihadists whose 'opposition' was not called so but termed 'the resistance' by luminaries of the Stop the War Coalition such as Tariq Ali and John Pilger.

The hypocrisy of this is not surprising but it is no less fundamentally repellent to the deepest core possible. Back in 2003, the 'Stop the War Coalition' continually ( and artificially ) yoked the fate of Palestine to Iraq when the line was the witless placard slogan 'Don't Attack Iraq: Freedom for Palestine'. 

Now after eleven years when a pyschotic jihadist movement called ISIS is murdering Christians and the Yazidis in northern Iraq, Lindsey German merely claims that is the fault of 'the west' for having invaded Iraq in the first place ( as if this was radical subversive knowledge we did not know ).

But German bemoans the fact too that 'the west' and Turkey and Saudi Arabia 'armed the rebels'. The 'rebels', in any case, are not one homogenous group and the failure of the Western powers to try to strongly advise Saudi Arabia and Qatar enough not to fund Sunni fundamentalist fanatics is an abject failure.

The Free Syria Army is connected with the Muslim Brotherhood backed by Qatar and which also supports and gives funds to that noble 'resistance' movement known as Hamas which is extolled by leading members of the absurdly entitled 'Stop the War Coalition'.

But, of course, German knows that, which is why, in accordance with doublethink, she omits to mention Qatar at all as a factor in the regional power politics of the Middle East. It's obvious that the US and Britain's 'intervention' in the Middle East has largely had negative consequences in Syria and Iraq.

However, to say there is plenty that could be 'done' to 'stop' Israel committing war crimes in Gaza while insinuating absolutely nothing could be 'done' to stop ISIS killing thousands of Christians and Yazidis does not add up. Any truly humane 'anti-war' activist would, at least try to outline what could be done.

Adding to that the sneering and embittered comment that if the 'Stop the War' movement is to be accused of double standards for not having anything to say about that then those concerned are 'Tory bloggers, shock jocks and neocons', it could be made plain that the leadership of the StWC is actually little better.

The STWC leadership consists of a miserable array of failed Trotskyist revolutionaries and sour malcontents whose insistence in hijacking the cause of being 'anti-war' is a total fraud and a con. If Galloway could not be described as a ranting shock jock , then it would be difficult to see who else could be.

There is a need for a principled opposition to Britain's foreign policy that is seldom there in Parliament any more. Unfortunately, the StWC cannot provide it because it sits there as a sort of established anti-establishment consisting of the same dreary faces and self important hack propaganists.

Maybe it's time for an alternative alternative ? One based on true principles and, above all, a real knowledge of the Middle East and not the same empahasis on pure political expediency and hypocrisy that defined Tony Blair's approach and that has, in part, been carried on by the British government since.

Israel, The Gaza War and the West

'Global revulsion at the mind-numbing carnage of Israel’s onslaught on Gaza seems finally to have spurred some of the western political class to speak out'. Seumas Milne, Gaza is a crime made in Washington as well as Jerusalem, The Guardian, Wednesday 6 August 2014

The reason why British politicians are hastening to position themselves against Israel's ruthless attack on Gaza has as much to do with dormant principles being awoken as with the fact, contrary to Milne's assertion, that Israel is acting completely in defiance of Washington and London.

That is a thought Seumas Milne never has been prepared to entertain. For him, it's quite clear Israel's assault on Gaza is one done with the connivance of 'the West' because he wants to claim only world opinion and outrage, as represented in and through him and his 'journalism' has led to an attitude shift.

However, Israel, has never, followed Washington's line nor was it ever a puppet of 'US Imperial Power', even during the Cold War. But its foreign policy has become increasingly independent in recent years, especially under Netanyahu who detests Obama and his administration for being 'soft' and pro-Arab.

The rise of Qatar as a major trade partner and gas rich oil emirate prepared to back the Muslim Brotherhood accounted for a gradual shift in the foreign policy of the Western Powers which preceded the 2014 War. Qatar was also prepared to back Gaza by supplying aid for infrastructure projects.

Evidently, the value of the arms deals remained a factor in the reluctance of British and US politicians to say anything condemnatory at the outset of current crisis this summer. But the point is that arms deals are usually tied to perceived strategical objectives and often energy interests.

With the collapse of Syria and the ongoing chaos in Iraq and Libya, the states carved out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire during and after the First world War 1914-1918 are coming unravelled. Across the Eastern Mediterranean and Greater Middle East, a new constellation of alignments have emerged.

The important year was 2011. Though Qatar is not a democracy, it used its gas wealth to support its regional policy of promoting Arab democracy in Egypt and Syria. The Obama administration was, in fact, not for the Egyptian coup in 2013 that restored the old order after the revolution of 2011 ( the 'Arab Spring ').

Nor was Britain. The reason was parly an admission that the old order of the secular dictator dating back to the post-1945 era and Cold War realpolitik was over. But it was also a recognition that Arab democracy was necessary is resentments at the old order were not to boil over into support for terrorism.

The Egyptian coup ended that and had to be accepted as an a fait accompli because of two things. Firstly, Russia was vying for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean with the discovery of the large gas reserves of the Levant Basin and was prepared to step in to supply arms to Sisi's military regime.

Secondly, despite an identification with some of Qatar's regional ambitions in tangent with Turkey, especially as part of the Friends of Syria Group-one dedicated to overthrowing Assad-the better to check Iran and advance a Qatar-pipeline, Egypt remained important as a geopolitical bulwark of stability.

Once Washington overcame its intitial hostility to the coup, it hastened to restore full military aid but it had not expected Israel to have taken that as a green light to impose its own 'solution' to its own problem with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, that is Hamas, with such exemplary brutality.

The Western Powers have been distinctly cool towards Netanyahu's revival of the 'war on terror' pose put forth under the Bush presidency and, as its diplomats and politicians have pointed out, the killing in Gaza is bad in itself but also makes it harder to assert US and British interests in the Middle East.

Israel, it should be remembered, was hostile to the West's backing for Sunni forces in Syria, brokered by Qatar and Turkey and designed to removed Assad. That's why Netanyahu praised Putin's Russia for negotiating the deal to remove Assad's chemical weapons without a military strike.

That, and the fact Israel has sought cooperation with Russia on arms developments and developing the offshore gas fields discovered in its territorial waters in 2010, hardly shows Israel to be a mere tool of the West just as vulgar propagandists such as Milne blithely assume.

Israel, has never, followed Washington's line nor was it ever a puppet or 'a satrapy' of Us Imperial Power, even during the Cold War. But it's foreign policy has become increasingly independent in recent years, especially under Netanyahu who detests Obama and his administration.

Washington, London and Paris have been gravitating towards Qatar because of energy interests and no longer regard the Israeli-Egypt-Saudi block as the main or important player in the Middle East. The growing consternation at the Israeli onslaught is a product of this changed reality.

Resource Wars: Israel, Egypt and the Dim Prospects for Peace Over Gaza

The prospects for peace between Israel and Gaza were bad enough and have grown dimmer due to the 2014 war. Both sides are predictably trying claim victory already. Actually, neither have won. The difference is the balance of terror lies decisively in Israel's favour in this brutal pyschopathological struggle.

From Netanyahu's perspective, the strategy is about forcing Hamas to surrender by whatever means (no matter the civilian casualties ) so they agree to demilitarise. But to get to that point he was ready to use a clearly 'disproportionate' amount of military force instead of one other thing-diplomacy.

From his perspective Israel cannot get a sustainable peace without war. As in Orwell's novel 1984, 'war is peace'. Hamas has to pretend that all the civilian dead are glorious martyrs to their cause in a jihad in which all the deaths and massacres could bring about a moral victory over the oppressor.

Hamas would not agree to demilitarise and have demanded the blockade to end. However, Israel would not agree to as it part of their strategy for national security. There is evidence that the wrangle over Gaza is being made more protracted by the fate of the Gaza Marine gas reserves.

Israel fought this war with ferocity because it wanted to crush Hamas and eliminate it as a potential proxy force while Hizbollah had been drawn deeply into the Syrian conflict by 2013. Despite Netanyahu's claims, Iran's backing for Hamas had declined dramatically due to sectarian enmities coming to the fore.

With Iran distracted and the Egyptian authoritarian regime of Sisi having destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2013 coup, Netanyahu went for Hamas while the time was right. One aim is to secure Israel's southern flank from rocket attacks because this would set back setting up gas rigs.

As Forbes magazine reported in January 2014,

'The rigs required to lift the gas from the sea floor are a target that some commentators have referred to as a “sitting duck” for terrorists. The gas platforms are to be situated outside of Israeli territorial waters, but inside Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), an area roughly twice the size of Israel itself'

One reason for the divided and vacillating response from the Western Powers was that major energy corporations have a stake in aiding Israel in tapping these reserves. Whether the US group Noble Energy or else Britain's BG Group in regards to Gaza Marine. 

That backing for Israel and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, has been complicated by the fact that Britain and the US's other regional partners in the region, Turkey and Qatar, are backing Hamas as part of a strategy to check Israel's dominance of the offshore reserves.

Increasingly, Britain and France draw much of their import of liquefied natural gas from Qatar and have formed bilateral trade ties to the gas rich emirate. This accounts for the start of a shift away from the position of backing Israel to criticism of its conduct of this war as much as humanitarian principles.

The problem is that Israel is acting unilaterally over Gaza so as to be able to tap the reserves as quickly as possible as a vital 'existential' interest that would put it in such as position to guarantee both its independence and importance for the West against Qatar and Turkey's rival ambitions.

Israel is going to be intransigent on the demilitarisation of Gaza and maintaining the blockade as it is regarded as necessary to ensure the energy security both of it and Egypt which, under Morsi in 2012, cut off its gas supply as it faced, and still does, a fuel crisis and economic deterioration.

The prospect for peace is low as Egypt is confronted with collapse if it were not able to import energy from Israel as agreed in in June 2014. As Egypt is seen as a key partner in defeating a jihadist insurgency raging on the Sinai Peninsula, Israel regards destroying Hamas as part of that wider battle.

Israeli national security involves energy both as a nationalist goal as a Gift from God. So Hamas is regarded as one of the threats to the exploitation of their gas reserves ( even those in Israel's territorial waters ) through rocket attacks and sabotage just as Hizbollah could from the north.

Such reasons for the blockade of Gaza not being emphasised in the Western media very much at all. Without the gas the regional security nexus with Egypt would be under threat. Since the 1970s has depended on Egypt to maintain the security of the borders with Israel in Sinai.

Even worse, there is a jihadist insurgency in Sinai at present and pipelines from Egypt to Israel were targeted and blown up in the past . Making the need to exploit the gas more and more important. Compromise could be difficult as Israel fears Hamas being used by Qatar to disrupt its regional energy strategy.

So the ceasefire could well not lead to a durable peace. Israel is not going to trust Hamas 'perhaps ever' as Tony Blair sinisterly intimated at the outset of the conflict on July 15 . Blair is hopeless as UN Quartet's Special Envoy to the region and has sided too obviously with Egypt and Israel against Turkey and Qatar.

Blair's bias and Netanyahu's nationalism means Israel has no interest in offering a Hamas controlled Gaza anything that would affect its energy security or enable Qatar and Turkey in alliance to use Hamas as a bargaining chip in what are increasingly dangerous geopolitical struggles for control over the gas fields and energy routes.

Gaza 2014: Why Ceasefires Are Going to be Harder and Harder to Keep.

No truce nor ceasefire could stick for long throughout July 2014 because the geopolitical stakes have been increased vastly in the course of the period between 2011 and 2014. One neglected aspect has been to explain the failure of diplomacy as a consequence of the growing regional rivalry between Qatar-Turkey and Israel. 

Whereas previous encounters between Hamas and the IDF could be described as conflicts, in 2014 there is now a apparently a war to the end. Hamas is fighting to the end because it knows Israel  seems bent on finishing them off and is not interested in a ceasefire but in their unconditional surrender. 

This is a resource war in which Israel wants to decisively crush Hamas, demilitarise Gaza and so secure Israel's control over the gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean against Qatar and Turkey's attempt to use Hamas as a bargaining chip in advancing other claims to the gas in the region. 

According to existing agreements a percentage of the revenues would go into a special fund earmarked for Palestinian economic development. At present, that stands at about 10% and would go to the West Bank and not to Gaza because Hamas in regarded still as a straightforwardly terrorist organisation.

Israel is not prepared to exploit those reserves if Hamas has any role in governing Palestine and Hamas has no interest in allowing Israel to exploit them under the existing agreements. Israel cannot, at present, completely guarantee the security of its gas rigs from sabotage and attack by Hamas

Israel fears Qatar using Gaza as a way of meddling in its much needed push to exploit the reserves, not merely the Gazan reserves but even Israeli gas fields which could be reached by Hamas rockets should Qatari funds be channelled away from infrastructure projects and into continued armed resistance.

Israel cannot afford that as tapping these resources is considered a strategic and economic imperative. The only way to get peace is if Hamas agrees to demilitarise the zone in accordance with outside powers or, from Israel's perspective, if Hamas is so relentlessly crushed that it ceases to be in any bargaining position. 

Netanyahu has made that quite clear. 'Sustainable quiet', in actual fact, means Israel can develop those gas resources as would any other advanced state in the world, a 'Gift from God', and it is connected with the idea of Israel's right to exist as a self sufficient economic power in the Eastern Mediterranean

The great surge of optimism about Israel's energy potential is mingled with pessimistic fears that Israel, despite being a nuclear armed state, could be intimidated by having its energy supplies affected. It was furious when Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood backed government cut gas exports from Egypt in 2012.

The use of energy as a tool of diplomacy led Israel into an energy crisis, making the necessity of getting Israeli gas on stream. The Egyptian coup of 2013 came as a relief to Israel and led, with the effective crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood by General Sisi, for the need to strengthen military and energy ties. 

These fears have increased at a time when the US is considered not to be as interested in upholding Israeli interests in the Middle East as it once was. The US has started cooperating far more with its opponent Qatar as a global hub for exporting and importing liquefied natural gas to both the EU and East Asia. 

Qatar has become an ever closer ally of Britain and France which increasingly buy more and more LNG as part of a strategy of energy diversification and to secure independence from Russia ( which is flexing its muscle once more because of its huge energy reserves ) and North Africa. 

With jihadists active in sabotaging pipelines in Algeria and Libya in continued state of chaos, Israel has, therefore, reckoned that it has to be a major regional energy player at least partly on a par with Qatar in order to maintain its independence and status and influence within Western capitals.

The failure to condemn Israel's actions in Gaza in partly about hedging their bets between Qatar on the one hand and Israel's potential for helping EU states, especially those in the Mediterranean such as Spain and Italy, and diversify supplies away from Russia ( especially with civil war in Ukraine ). 

The sheer level of ignorance of the role of resources in driving the current war prevents a true understanding of the real geopolitical stakes and why the regional and global actors concerned with this war are acting in a way that appears callous, brutal, indifferent and revoltingly hypocritical.