Egypt: The Coming Darkness

The death toll stands at about 149 people. The security forces moved in yesterday with bulldozers and armed police to eject Muslim Brotherhood supporters protesting in street camps against their president, Muhammad Morsi, being removed from office by the Egyptian army. Bloodshed was inevitable from then on.

But Egypt's descent into civil war was always likely from the moment the army dissolved the Egyptian Parliament on July 14 2012. By doing so, the Muslim Brotherhood was always going to try to proceed to go on and grab as much power as they could through the presidency of Morsi.

Two things are important here. Firstly, the Morsi presidency was never legitimate as no constitution providing checks and balances on the president's authority had been agreed prior to the election. He gained only 51% of the vote against a Mubarak regime candidate, Ahmed Shafik, in a vote with only 43% turnout.

Secondly, the military takeover on July 3 2013 was meant to exploit popular resentment at the way the Muslim Brotherhood had stolen the revolution of 2011 to impose their own version of a constitution without a clear and legitimate democratic mandate to do so.

The Egyptian security force's use of brutality in crushing the Muslim Brotherhood now is exactly what they have always wanted for two decades. A discredited Islamist opposition, that had botched its attempt to embrace democracy by trying to exclude liberal and leftist parties, could be conclusively removed.

But the sheer excess of force being used is also a demonstration to other players in the "Arab Spring" that the Egyptian army is ultimately in control. The security forces have repeatedly used force since 2011 against non-Islamist protesters who were angry at the absence of guaranteed democratic reforms.

What this "mopping up" operation in Cairo proves is that the nonsensical platitudes from Western politicians and envoys about getting democracy 'back on track' fail to grasp the reality. Western liberal observers  invested hopes in the Arab Spring that were entirely misplaced

There was never a functioning democracy in Egypt nor a revolution in 2011 but only a revolt coopted by the army into legitimising a de facto coup against Mubarak. From then on the old regime sought to defend its power by winning a duel with the main threat to that in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The 'Arab Spring' was a myth; it was, as historian Mark Almond writes, 'regime change as an inside job' .The very day after Mubarak's resignation late on 11th February 2011 the crowds, who had whipped themselves up into a fervour of hope through social media websites in Tahrir Square were dispersed.

Effectively, the it was the Egyptian army came to power in 2011. The coup of July 3 only allowed it to move centre stage and finish off the remnants of an unpopular and defeated Muslim Brotherhood. By invoking a 'state of emergency' it could pose itself as the guardian of economic and political order.

Before the 'Arab Spring', the Muslim Brotherhood had always been able to pretend to be a potential rival alternative. The Egyptian army knew it could remove that threat by acting when it did at a time of economic chaos and that the potential terrorist threat, real or imagined, could be used to bolster its power.

For if the destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood leads to a resurgence of Islamist terrorism, it can be guaranteed that its financial remit from external powers would be continued. No power would want Egypt destabilised because of the Suez Canal and its geostrategic role as an oil and gas transit state.

Even if Washington decided to remove its $1.3bn annual funding, it would not make a great deal of difference to the Egyptian army which controls 40% of the economy. The Gulf States would step in to shore up the protector of the Sumed pipeline that pumps oil west to energy intensive European nations.

The Egyptian army, in any case, has until the end of 2013 to conclusively bring about the appearance of a 'democratic transition' as Washington is already pledged to providing the remaining cash for bureaucratic reasons. If it can be effected and 'stability' achieved, the calculation is that it will be business as usual.

The indications are that this cannot be the case. Libya is awash with arms after the regime change aided by Western military intervention. Al Qaida's message about a US backed coup by an 'Americanised' army will be heeded by scores of angry unemployed men without a future in an overpopulated nation.

Western politicians are wary. If Egypt collapses into anarchy, the current balance of power and set up that has existed since the 1970s will collapse. If discontent spreads into Saudi Arabia, an oil price shock could cause economic collapse across the world, especially in the EU, and lead to terrorist blowback.

The Revolution that Never Was.

Tawakkol Karman, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and advocate of the "Jasmine Revolution" in Yemen has condemned the military coup in Egypt. She is in no doubt that the 'Arab Spring' was, in fact, a true revolution.

'My support for the 30 June movement in opposition to Morsi changed after the military coup, which went against all the gains and values of the 25 January revolution.

The 25 January revolution guaranteed freedom of expression, of assembly and organisation. All these freedoms have been crushed in the aftermath of the coup.'

Yet the July 3 coup in Egypt did not crush all the freedoms gained in the Arab Spring because there were no actual gains. From the time the revolt of 2011 led to Mubarak being allowed to fall, the better to defuse discontent, the Egyptian state structures inherited from the previous era readapted to the new reality.

The January 25 'revolution' was nothing much more than repeat of the 1952 revolution enlivened and facilitated by the illusion of 'People Power' spawned by modern communications technology and social media. No freedoms were guaranteed by the Arab Spring of 2011.

The referendum on changing the constitution 19 March 2011 only approved the demand for reforms that were never ratified by the Egyptian Constituent in Assembly before it was dissolved by SCAF in June 2012 after a Supreme Court ruling declared electoral irregularities in Muslim Brotherhood seats.

The failure to have a new constitution in place before the presidential elections subsequently took place just two weeks after the brief experiment of an elected parliament ended meant that the electoral turnout was very low even for the first run off. For the president's powers had not been defined.

The coup against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore,removed a president who only got a fraction of the vote from the total number of Egyptian citizens and who was voted in through elections that were not fully legitimate because no new constitition, as promised in 2011, had materialised.

It was the attempt by Morsi, among his other botched and incompetent manouevres, to force through a constitution without an elected parliament in December 2012 that created fears of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover and the creation of an Islamist republic that were exploited by the Egyptian army.

So despite Morsi being elected, he lacked legitimacy and was in the weak position set up for the Muslim Brotherhood by the old elites who had little to lose by either having Shafik ( Morsi's rival candidate and Mubarak's last PM) as president or Morsi to take the flak for Egypt's chaos.

'It is unrealistic and unfair to believe Morsi was responsible for the failure to achieve economic prosperity within a year of his presidency. The man inherited a huge legacy of failure and institutional collapse from the previous regime.'

True, but it was unrealistic of Morsi to be determined to go for the presidency and right into a trap that was set for him. Karmen's dubious when she writes 'the success of heads of state or government is measured more by their respect for civil and political rights than by economic prosperity'.

If that ought to be the situation, it is not clear that it is. The 2011 Arab revolts were precipitated by economic mismanagement and corruption and the rocketing price of bread caused by the impact of global heating and grain shortage. The demand for civil and political rights does not guarantee bread on the table.

Karmen then claims,

'Morsi passed this tough test by guaranteeing these rights when, in fact, his opponents enjoyed more freedom than his own supporters. Compare this to what has been happening to his supporters since the coup: hundreds have been detained, killed or wounded'.

Morsi did not guarantee civil and political rights. He attempted to push a constitution through without a sitting parliament to check his authority. Moreover, Egyptian human rights activists complained that the torture and beatings by the police continued as well as threats to political opponents.

The Arab Spring so far has been an utter failure. There was no revolution. Only a revolt, the decapitation of the old regime, a shambolic attempt to institute democracy without there being an agreed constitutional change first and then a grubby power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and an old regime still in place.

It remains to be seen whether a new constitution can now be drawn up that will allow a transition to a functioning democracy. But with the Muslim Brotherhood desperately maintaining their street sit ins and protests, the security situation gives every reason for the state to retain emergency powers.

As Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi put it "We cannot write a constitution when the country is divided. We have to return to harmony". There is a lot of talk about 'national dialogue'. Yet it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood look likely not to be able to participate in that without losing face and even more support.

The one thing Karmen does get right, though, is the danger that the coup poses in ramping up 'extremist' threats in Egypt.

'It is dreadful to imagine the long-term consequences of frustration with democracy. Al-Qaida and those sympathetic to it have always mocked the Muslim Brotherhood, telling them that the solution would not come via ballot boxes, but through bullets'.

The problem now for those who promoted the Arab Spring is whether they are going to accept the coup as irreversible fact because there are no chances that President Morsi will be reinstated (which risks being seen to give tacit support for the suppression of 'democracy' ) or call for another revolt from below.

Resource Revolts

Commentators on the fall out from the 'Arab Spring' of 2011, with Egypt having seen a coup and Tunisia teetering on the brink of potential civil conflict to, have tended to skate over the role of environmental factors that drove the revolts in the first place. Back in 2011 Michael Klare warned of 'Resource Revolts' and the 'Year of Living Dangerously'.

With events in Egypt unfolding there will be now years of severe danger ahead.

From now on, rising prices, powerful storms, severe droughts and floods, and other unexpected events are likely to play havoc with the fabric of global society, producing chaos and political unrest. Start with a simple fact: the prices of basic food staples are already approaching or exceeding their 2008 peaks, that year when deadly riots erupted in dozens of countries around the world. 

 It’s not surprising then that food and energy experts are beginning to warn that 2011 could be the year of living dangerously -- and so could 2012, 2013, and on into the future.  Add to the soaring cost of the grains that keep so many impoverished people alive a comparable rise in oil prices -- again nearing levels not seen since the peak months of 2008 -- and you can already hear the first rumblings about the tenuous economic recovery being in danger of imminent collapse.  Think of those rising energy prices as adding further fuel to global discontent.

Already, combined with staggering levels of youth unemployment and a deep mistrust of autocratic, repressive governments, food prices have sparked riots in Algeria and mass protests in Tunisia that, to the surprise of the world, ousted long-time dictator President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and his corrupt extended family.  And many of the social stresses evident in those two countries are present across the Middle East and elsewhere.  No one can predict where the next explosion will occur, but with food prices still climbing and other economic pressures mounting, more upheavals appear inevitable. These may be the first resource revolts to catch our attention, but they won’t be the last.

Put simply, global consumption patterns are now beginning to challenge the planet’s natural resource limits.  Populations are still on the rise, and from Brazil to India, Turkey to China, new powers are rising as well.  With them goes an urge for a more American-style life.  Not surprisingly, the demand for basic commodities is significantly on the rise, even as supplies in many instances are shrinking.  At the same time, climate change, itself a product of unbridled energy use, is adding to the pressure on supplies, and speculators are betting on a situation trending progressively worse.  Add these together and the road ahead appears increasingly rocky.

Breadbaskets without Bread

Let’s begin with food, the most important and volatile of these commodities.  Food prices declined in October 2008 after the onset of the global financial crisis, but that seems to have been an anomaly.  The December 2010 index of global food prices compiled by the U.N.’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) hit a record 215, one point higher than in the spring of 2008.  (In that index, based on a “bundle” of food staples, a baseline of 100 represents average prices in 2002-2004.)  In fact, some food products, including sugar, cooking oils, and fats, are now trading substantially above their 2008 levels; others, including dairy products, grains, and meat, are inching perilously close to record levels.

As 2011 begins, food experts fear that, within months, prices for key staples will climb above the 2008 threshold and stay there, causing extreme hardship for poor people around the world.  “We are at a very high level,” said a worried Abdolreza Abbassian, an economist at the FAO.  “These levels in the previous episode led to problems and riots across the world.”

The full version can be read here.

The Egyptian Coup : Causes and Consequences

The Egyptian military coup of July 3 was a turning point in the history of the Arab revolts. However, the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 was, to use AJP Taylor's phrase' on Germany in 1848, more generally the point where Arab history 'reached its turning point and failed to turn'.

The Egyptian 'deep state' that developed under post colonial dictatorships and the dominance of the army was not really affected by the Egyptian uprising. It was a 'people power' demonstration; there was never a revolution against the deep state and so no actual revolution as in Iran in 1979.

Essentially, what has happened is that the old elites allowed Mubarak to fall in order to appease popular opinion and to try to introduce a measure of controlled democratic representation. That was in continuity with rather more limited experiments in that direction in the 1990s and 2000s.

Set against the background of the disintegrating economy and food crisis, one brought about by a lethal combination of longer term climate changes and demographic pressures, the Egyptian army was able to protect the deep state by allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to take responsibility for the worsening chaos.

A trap was set for the Muslim Brotherhood in having the Supreme Court declare electoral regularities in their seats as a pretext to dissolve the Egyptian Parliament in June 2012.  That was two weeks before an election between a Mubarak era PM and Morsi to vote president who would be the only democratic representative.

That benefited the deep state as it meant that either an old regime appointee would be elected or else a leader without experience who would prove too weak to challenge vested interests. Morsi approved IMF austerity measures and the torture and beatings in Egyptian prisons were not stopped. Nothing changed.

Army grandees such as General Sisi have taken a gamble on a coup because there was mass popular support to be rid of Morsi from those who believed his presidency was leading towards Egypt becoming ungovernable and descending into further economic chaos.

In addition, Salafi jihadists were causing havoc in North Sinai along with Bedouins. The Muslim Brotherhood were portrayed as a danger to Egypt's 'stability' by beings allegedly indulgent towards Islamist terrorists. That has seemed to threaten the basis of the settlement agreed in 1979 between Egypt and Israel.

General Sisi also knew he could execute a coup because the US would be hardly likely to withdraw the $1.3bn it provides to the Egyptian army to provide 'stability' and protect its geostrategic interests. These include preserving peace on the Israeli borders, oil and gas pipelines against attack and the Suez Canal.

The obvious flaw in this plan is that the coup is likely to ensure that Islamist radicals are more likely to resort to terrorism because they can be sure that more alienated and unemployed young men will see the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood as a sign that only armed resistance can remove the corrupt elites.

If Egypt descended into chaos, it is likely that global jihadists could find a foothold just as they have in Syria. Arms are awash in neighbouring Libya and many jihadists went from Libya to fight in Syria and could also enter the fray in Egypt. This would pose severe threats to world peace.

Egypt is the largest and most influential Arab nation and its collapse would trigger off collapse elsewhere. Yet the move towards a democratic transition in Egypt is bound to be stalled by the coup because it is impossible to see when elections could be held in conditions of anarchy and violence on the streets. 

Events in Egypt may well now spill beyond a turning point at which the course of history did not turn. It , and the entire Middle East, could be heading beyond the point of no return towards violence and civil war which will shake the foundations of the entire global order.

Egypt: The General Will is the Will of the General.

General Abdel-Fatah Sisi is trying to exploit his popular role in getting rid of Morsi by calling on protesters to demonstrate a show of strength against both the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorists as though both are necessarily the same and one. That is useful in justifying greater military authority after the terror attack in Mansoura

The reason is that Sisi is no doubt trying to capitalise from the sort of popular revulsion that met the Luxor terrorist attacks of 1997 and forced the Muslim Brotherhood to detach itself from the more radical Islamists who were prepared to use violence.

Essentially, what has happened since 2011 is a power game between the Mubarak era elites and the Muslim Brotherhood. Those in Egypt wanting parliamentary democracy were no more impressed by the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt to control Egypt than they were of the old elites trying to cling on.

Hence Tarek Shalaby, an Egyptian advocate of democratic reform comments,

"We want Morsi to go on trial – but not only him, we want him in a cage with Sisi, Tantawi [Sisi's predecessor as army chief] and Mubarak's men too. The problem is that we're being cornered into thinking we need to support the army in cracking down on the Islamists. But we're against this bipolar situation where we're forced to take sides, one against the other. We're with the revolution – against both Scaf [the supreme council of the armed forces] and the Brotherhood."

Evidently, the opposition to Morsi was divided between a variety of secular democrats, Muslim democrats who are not Islamists, Nasserists, liberal, socialists who wanted to propel the revolution towards a full democratic conclusion.

After all, it must be remembered that the Egyptian Parliament was dissolved after the Supreme Court decided that the Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for electoral irregularities in elections. That happened in June 2012 just two weeks before the presidential elections began.

That only gave Egyptians the choice between Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and a candidate who had been the last prime minister appointed by Mubarak. That was hardly a choice and in the absence of any elected representatives in a constituent assembly it was inevitable that anger would boil over this year.

However, it is arguable whether the uprising in 2011 was, in fact, a revolution in the first place for either the army or Muslim Brotherhood to seek to 'steal' Is the interim government going to be able to agree on a new constitution that satisfies those wanting to complete the movement away from dictatorship ?

In Egypt it seems that democracy is still viewed in majoritarian terms or 'the will of the people' where one party of set of interests can appeal to 'the people' on the street. This shows an unsophisticated view of democracy where the general will can become the will of the general.

The interim government has only until February 2014 to have secured a new constitution that will satisfy Egyptians before general elections but it is difficult to see how it can be easily consented to as legitimate given that Egypt is polarised between those who hold to Islamist democracy and others to liberal democracy.

It is quite possible the old elites and army will attempt what leaders since 1952 have done in Egypt which is to try to offer something to the Islamists by enshrining an certain interpretation of Islam in the constitution and trying to bribe and coopt certain Muslim Brotherhood leaders. It can divide and rule that way.

In reality, apart from social networking and 'people power' in the street nothing much has changed in Egypt since 2011. Only the economy lurching from bad to worse and a brief botched attempt at democracy being hijacked by the Muslim Brotherhood and then thrown out by the army to popular acclaim.

The only thing that has changed is that most Egyptians have had a taste of 'people power' and expectations are higher than before without the capacity of any new government to be able to deliver basic economic security. In such a situation the prospect of violence and civil conflict remains.

The Second Coming of Revolution or a Third Coup ?

The question of the whether the Second Egyptian Uprising is part of an unfinished democratic revolution or a coup that destroyed a democratically elected government has to take into consideration if there ever was a revolution in the first place or a popular overthrow of a dictator coopted by the Egyptian military.

Many were not very satisfied with having the choice in the presidential elections of 2012 between an ex-military figure, Ahmed Shafik , a leftover from the Mubarak regime who hot 48.27% of the vote compared to Morsi's 51.73% from a turnout of 43.4%.

As for any new elections,as promised by the transitional government, it is quite possible the Muslim Brotherhood would boycott them if it gets held as promised next year. They became very unpopular with Egyptians. If they did participate they may well lose.

The elections set by the interim president for February 2014 are parliamentary ones as there has not been an election since late 2011 and parliament was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court on 12 June 2012 just two days before the presidential elections that Morsi went on to win began.

One reason Morsi is deeply unpopular is that he tried to use presidential decree to challenge the constitution and push it in a direction more suitable for the Islamists and proceeded to rule without there being a parliament at a time of growing economic chaos and collapse.

It could be that the army and the judiciary, consisting of Mubarak era appointees, were content for Morsi to step into power in order to let him make a mess of his rule set against the fact parliament was dissolved on the basis that there had been electoral irregularities in MB seats.

From the perspective of the anti-Morsi street demonstrators and groups wanting to push the revolution forward from 2011, the need is for a new constitution and new parliamentary elections. The scale of trust being placed in the army looks as though it could have been misplaced.

The Egyptian military leaders most likely know that if elections are held in February 2014 the Muslim Brotherhood will not win a majority of seats. Maybe this was part of the plan. SCAF has overseen the entire 'transition' process from the fall of Mubarak to the present so there was no real 'revolution' in the first place.

The Muslim Brotherhood called the dissolution of parliament a coup but it also stalled the progress of the democratic revolution rival parties had called for. So the second coup of  2013 is a part of second revolution to those who wanted a new constitution. But the second coup might really have been the third one.

After all, the revolt against Mubarak in 2011 was essentially  coopted and presided over by the military. It was a way of getting rid of a discredited dictator the better to coalition a new regime that would represent better the 'will of the people' while serving to prop up the machinery of government inherited from Mubarak.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Down But Not Out.

'Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates dipped into their oil revenues this week to stump up a cool $12bn (£8bn) to bail out cash-strapped Egypt – a swift reward for the army's removal of President Mohamed Morsi and the stunning blow to his Muslim Brotherhood.'

( Ian Black, Egypt's overthrow of Morsi creates uncertainty for Islamists everywhere, The Guardian 12 July 2013

 "I am convinced that we are seeing the twilight of the Islamic revival not only in Egypt but across the Arab world..For a while it was the only alternative to secular dictatorship. That was the conventional wisdom for 30 years. It no longer is." - Hani Shukrullah.

The demise of Islamism as a force in Egyptian politics is greatly exaggerated. The two questions are really these; whether the new government can reverse the economic chaos and, ominously, the prospects of worsening food shortages and whether it can do so rapidly enough to placate those on the streets.

The bleak reality is that if the new government cannot ensure food security then it faces increased anger in the cities will be exploited by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hunger will drive the poorer elements of Egyptian society to support the removal of the government and fights against rival protesters.

On Negotiations with the New Government .

The Guardian states,

'Brotherhood officials had denied they were negotiating with a military regime that has arrested several key members since Morsi's fall, and issued warrants for hundreds more.'

The whole point of the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy of calling on its supporters to 'rise up' is to get them into the streets and keep up the pressure on the new transitional government to regard it as a force in Egyptian politics. there is nothing much the MB can do as it cannot challenge the army.

As the new de facto government lacks legitimacy among the MB's supporters, who belong mostly to the poorer classes, struggling small tradesmen and university graduates shut out of Egypt's political and economic life, the tactic will be to position itself for any failure by the government to alleviate poverty.

If the technocratic government of Hazem Beblawy fails to deliver some improvement in the economic situation and stave off a potentialy disastrous food shortage, the Muslim Brotherhood can move centre stage again. Hence the move already to get pro-Morsi supporters protesting in Tahrir Square.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not going to collapse as a political force. It has managed to survive repression under Mubarak for years because it acted as political organisation and charity organisation providing welfare to the burgeoning population of rural migrants in the cities who failed to benefit from IMF approved policies.

The most ominous part of the Egyptian crisis is that if the economic policies of the technocratic government fail then the political turmoil will be protracted and the economy will shrink even further. With investors and tourists staying away the inflow of hard currency is dwindling and wheat imports cannot be afforded.

The Muslim Brotherhood are aware that the new government will inherit a crisis. A former Musri government minister Bassem Ouda has claimed the state had just 500,000 tonnes of imported wheat left whereas the country normally imports around 10 million tonnes a year.

The new technocratic government faces an appalling task of feeding a population that is already exceeding the carrying capacity of the environment in Egypt and creating a large pool of unemployed young men without opportunities who could well turn to jihadism. Egypt is already vastly overpopulated.

The Prospect of Civil War in Egypt

'War consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known'-Thomas Hobbes.

It is possible that the military responded to the Muslim Brotherhood protesters outside the Cairo barracks, killing 51 people, because some in the crowd were armed and wanted to provoke or panic the army into shooting. Or else some were determined to give the Muslim Brothers a 'whiff of grapeshot'.

The military takeover was bound to be resisted by the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and these killings can only intensify the the sense of martyrdom that has been used to mobilise them; it has put a seal of blood on the cause and will commit the Muslim Brotherhood to continue advocating their people to 'rise up'.

The broad competing power blocs in Egypt now trying to pose as the legitimate heirs to the 2011 'revolution'-both the Muslim Brotherhood and those who supported its removal-have deep antagonistic roots that go back to the divisions caused by Sadat's 'open door' reforms of the economy in the 1970s.

After 1973 and Israel's victory in another Arab-Israeli War, Sadat had moved towards making Egypt more closely dependent on the US instead of the USSR in order to fund its military and economy. The IMF became involved and its deficit reduction conditions for aid led to food prices being raised.

The economic conditions were created, along with rapid urbanisation and growing populations, for the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood to represent the poorer Egyptians who migrated to Cairo and the struggling traders shut out of mainstream economic life by the control exercised by Westernised elites.

Set against that the way the Muslim Brotherhood had been repressed by Nasser after he came to power the 1952 with their help, the theme of the betrayal of the umma by illegitimate usurpers and fake Muslims has been a consistent one that has now been given added edge.

The irony is that President Morsi had accepted the close relationship with the US especially on foreign policy and he was never in a position to challenge the army's position. Neither were the army not anti-Islamist Egyptians prepared to give him time to preside over more economic uncertainty and decay.

For decades the economic model proscribed by the the US and the IMF has not made for social stability nor an economy not dependent upon an entrenched elite and bureaucracy from using aid to bolster their own interests. Infant industries have failed to compete against allowing Western technological imports.

Now in 2013 there seems to prospect of Egypt being able to move away from a failing economy at the very time when its political chaos is deterring investment and the IMF is imposing condition on aid that involve austerity measures such as the cutting of fuel subsidies and raising sales tax on goods.

Despite the fact Morsi backed these measures to get IMF aid, the collapsing economy is interpreted through 'culture wars' as Muslim Brotherhood supporters see the entire problem in Egypt as being the fact that evil corrupt pagans have monopolised the system for themselves.

The Muslim Brotherhood for a long time has preached that by Islamising society more it can create the conditions upon which true virtue will flourish and corruption in the way aid is administered banished and  the spread to real wealth to believers assured.

For his supporters Morsi's removal is an attack on those hopes and his restoration a precondition for any alleviation of their poverty and economic deprivation. For those who supported his removal it was seen as a precondition of any chance to revive tourism, push for open democracy and restore the economy.

The factors driving civil conflict are based on deep rooted intractable divisions. Both sides are claiming that the revolution has been perverted or stolen from them and both regard the other as counter-revolutionaries prepared to use force and terrorise the other. So now, perhaps, only power and force can decide the outcome.

The question is really whether radical Islamists could possibly put up an armed revolt and what access to weapons they have. There are no signs that any in the army are prepared to defect to the rival 'revolution' against which the coup was directed-both in the name of preserving the gains of 2011 against dictatorship.

Would the US Back a Military Coup in Egypt ?

Some are already suggesting the US is  involved in the coup but just cannot publicly support it and has been hypocritically keeping its distance from it.Many would like the believe that the US had done because that would simplify their interpretation of events.

Even so, there is still no evidence do that the US has any interests in instigating a coup. Obviously the US cannot publicly support the military takeover as that would be technically illegal and it would have difficulties justifying the $1.3 bn it funds the Egyptian military with.

But that it not the same as being active in backing a coup and plotting with the Egyptian military to overthrow Morsi, something that was not clearly in the interests of the US. Morsi was prepared to accept the IMF plans for the economy and US policy on Syria.

On the other hand, Morsi's pan-Islamist rhetoric was hugely unpopular with the Egyptian military. Not least the intention to relax border restrictions on the Gaza Strip which military figures claimed would endanger security in Sinai and allow pro-Morsi terrorists to enter Egypt.

Given that the US has funded the Egyptian military to preserve the nation as an 'anchor of stability' in the Middle East-in particular its peace treaties with Israel which date back to the end of the 1973 war-it has no interest in being seen to be either for or against the army's actions.

For a start, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders during the 48 hour period they were given by the military to step down started to try and frame the action as though there might have been US backing. In the event of being overthrown they could then mobilise anti-American sentiments.

Even so, unless there is evidence the US actually did explicity give backing to a coup, the conclusion has to be that events simply caught the US and UK off guard. Before the coup the main focus of both powers was on Syria. And Blair has his own self serving reasons for his views.

Ultimately, the US will most likely give tacit de facto support to the Egyptian military's action as and when 'stability' is restored and some semblence of democracy reintroduced. But the Muslim Brotherhood has every interest in protracting the crisis so that looks unlikely.

But it seems obvious that the US did not want to be put in this position at a time when it was considering arming the Sunni insurgents in Syria to fight against the pro-Iranian Alawi regime of Assad. One important group in that struggle is led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and backed by Turkey.

More generally Western policy in the Middle East is in total disarray at present. The idea Washington has or can have total control over events there is a comforting myth believed in by fervent believers in US imperialism and its staunchest critics alike. There is no evidence for it.

Egypt: When is a Coup is Not a Coup ?

If  a coup has not officially happened in Egypt it is certainly a military takeover that could well be seen to be a coup should the Egyptian army's control not proceed to elections and the resumption of free elections rather quickly. That has to involve the Muslim Brotherhood to some extent as it is not a 'terrorist organisation'.

The Muslim Brotherhood is hardly one monolithic bloc of fanatics. It contains radical and moderate factions, the leaders trying to control events by calling for mass protest and to retain a presence on the street while calling on their supporters to refrain from outright violence.

The problem is that now the Muslim Brotherhood has been humiliated and its leaders arrested, that radical factions might well revert to going underground an fomenting plots against the state as it did for most of its history when it was influenced heavily by the ideologies of al Banna and, more radically, by Qutb

That was alluded to by Salah Sultan, a senior official in the Brotherhood and Egypt's deputy minister of Islamic affairs "We will go underground if we have to". Even if only around 30 have died so far after pro-Morsi rallies of 50,000 have amassed and there is a trend towards paramilitary demonstrations around Cairo University

If violence becomes protracted in the coming days and weeks in a heated atmosphere in Cairo, radical supporters of  the Muslim Brotherhood may revert to plotting terror attacks  as the 'moderating' influences of the "Guidance Council" and top officials diminish as they are disappear under the army's detention.

This will certainly be the case should there be absolutely no freedom for them to campaign democratically as happened for a long time under Mubarak's regime and set against the raised expectations of having had a taste of democratically elected power.

Any new government would need to co-opt Islamists in order to try to provide some sort of concession to this popular bloc in Egyptian society but with the scale and depth of the polarisation, between those who support the Muslim Brotherhood and those who see it as a majoritarian tyranny, this seems hardly possible.

Indeed such concessions happened intermittently from the 1980s under the old regime as policy swung between limited toleration and inclusion followed by expulsion from the political process and repression when the Muslim Brotherhood started to push for the repression of minorities such as the Coptic Christians.

Yet every time the Muslim Brotherhood got a measure of power in Egypt they tended to show that they were not ready to tolerate attempts by the Egyptian government to divide opposition and rule by amending the  constitution to Islam as `the religion of the state` and allow women and Christians to run for the presidency.

The reality is that with a collapsing economy, rising food prices, hunger and anger the Egyptian government has little time to enforce the stability needed and then act in a conciliatory way to both Islamist groups and various secular democratic forces without there being the potential for conflict and civil discontent.

The outcome of the crisis in Egypt will either be repression under a military regime that will lead to a potential for terrorist attacks or the return of a measure of democracy in which Islamists may well have a chance of regaining power unless they are pointedly excluded and which could also lead to violence on the streets.

The Second Egyptian Uprising of 2013

The Second Egyptian uprising is complicated and few have any idea what the army takeover will mean in practice. There are two broad currents of popular opinion in Egypt.The first are those who believe in pushing Egypt towards becoming a more Islamic republic under Morsi.

Those who support Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are usually poorer and more uneducated with little understanding of what the procedures of a functioning democracy are beyond imposing the will of the 'Godly' people against those forces that are not.

The second consists of a broad coalition of the educated and more secular minded Egyptians, Coptic Christians and anti-Islamist Muslims who resent the Muslim Brotherhood because its puritanism and incompetence is bad for the economy and the tourist industry.

For years before the 2011 revolution, Egypt was trapped in a cycle of fanatical Islamist revolt and state repression. When terrorists murdered tourists in Luxor in 1997 there was mass revulsion against Islamists who reacted with a ceasefire against Mubarak.

Subsequently, the more moderate Islamists represented by Morsi built up a rival power base and were dedicated to working their way to power through a democratic mandate as a means to impose their brand of state power on society in a way that cannot be other than polarising and divisive.

The problem has been, set against the background of a collapsing economy, that the Morsi regime has been seen to be allowing radicalised Islamists some freedom to persecute minorities such as the Copts in order to retain a populist power base, a strategy that shows continuity with Mubarak's dictatorship.

The opposition to Morsi is based upon those politically minded Egyptians with a memory of constitutional rule for thirty years before Colonel Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak ended the relatively free expression of opinion and imposed military rule and dictatorship.

It's not certain whether Egypt is really going to follow the pattern followed by Pakistan of regular popular army coups as Jonathan Steele suggests. Egypt is an ancient land with a social and cultural unity that gives it an identity beyond being a nation defined only by Islam. Nor is it divided on sectarian lines as Syria.

The army takeover, called by the BBC a coup, may well accentuate a society already polarised in to two rival camps. Yet it was polarised in any case by Morsi's rule and the fact the Muslim Brotherhood has an illiberal majoritarian 'will of the umma' concept of democracy as set against a liberal constitutional alternative.

The educated classes in Cairo and others annoyed at Morsi do not want a choice of either secular dictatorship backed by the army or an Islamist regime dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood but to push for the proper full democracy with a functioning constitution and checks and balances promised in 2011.

Whether the protesters in Tahrir Square will get that or not is not at all certain.