Thailand 2014 : The Year of Living Dangerously.

The vocal condemnation of the Thai army coup by the West could be a diplomatic mistake as might the US decision to suspend about one third of the aid provided to Thailand. None of it can affect events in Thailand nor determine the outcome of the power struggle for control after King Bhumibol Adulyadej dies.

The willingness of Washington to make a principled stand against a military coup reflects the fact that since 2011, the year of Yingluck Shinawatra's election, the Obama administration has pursued its Pivot To Asia strategy in which Thailand is considered a key regional partner in the quest to contain China.

General Prayuth, the head of the army and leading figure in the 2006 coup, is part of Thailand's 'monarchy-military nexus' which has felt pushed out of influence with the rise of Thaksin's party as it keeps winning elections and has been tacitly supported by the US since 2011

The reason for that is the authoritarian government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the PM from 2008 to 2011, one backed on the streets by the Yellow Shirts, had not proved as pro-US as Washington had hoped after the 2006 coup and raised the prospect of Thailand turning closer to China as a regional partner.

With the dispute between Vietnam and China over the oil and fish of the South China Sea reaching crisis point, Beijing could be posed to exploit the growing rift between the US and the interim coup government to step in to offer arms deals and military aid to the beleaguered monarchy-military nexus.

An authoritarian government in Bangkok dominated by former members of the Democrat Party would be far more congenial to China which has been attempting to cultivate its 'soft power' ties with Bangkok's Sino-Thai business and political elite as a means of rivalling the US for influence.

China has no interest in watching Thailand become closer to Cambodia and Myanmar as part of a coalition of states hostile to China's claims to dominate the South China Sea within the nine dash line just as Thailand and Cambodia have no oil interests at stake in these maritime waters.

By contrast with Washington, Beijing has been mute in response to the coup. Being far more pragmatic, diplomats in Beijing realise that the Thai elites, whether supporters of Thaksin's party or the opposition, would not take kindly to lectures or direct meddling from the West.

The dilemma for Washington now is if tried using punitive sanctions stronger than those after 2006 it could end up pushing whichever faction wrests control after the 2014 coup closer towards Beijing and, in effect, lose a military alliance it has had since the height of the Cold War in the 1950s.

As Ernie Bower of the Center for Strategic and International Studies made plain, “You could lose an alliance and if you don’t lose an alliance, you could in effect lose the primacy of a friendship with one of ASEAN’s anchor countries". Having Myanmar is the US orbit would hardly be compensation.

2014 is going to be a year of living dangerously. Thailand is the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia. But the impact of higher fuel and food prices in an oil import dependent economy is widening social divisions and creating political polarisation between the old elites and the rural masses and urban wage earners.

With the US and China vying for influence, it could be that an authoritarian regime emerging from out of the military coup would be backed by either Great Power, more likely China, and that this, and the reactionary stance of the Sino-Thai elites backing the Yellow Shirts,  could add ethnic enmities to class resentments.

The Pivot To Asia: China, Vietnam and the New Cold War.

'China's provocative decision to station a $1bn (£600m) deep-sea oil drilling rig in disputed waters 120 miles off Vietnam – well within Hanoi's 200-mile exclusive economic zone, in clear breach of a 2011 bilateral maritime pact and in defiance of regional and international agreements' ( Simon Tisdall, Vietnam's fury at China's expansionism can be traced to a troubled history, Guardian May 15 2014 )

The anti-Chinese riots across Vietnam reflect the upsurge in nationalism in the Far East created by the pathological quest for control over the oil and gas in the South China Sea and China's bid for regional economic and military hegemony in opposition to US designs to thwart these ambitions by .

China has been prepared to back up the CNOOC's drilling off the Paracel Islands with 80 ships to protect the oil rig on its journey against Vietnamese vessels which were rammed and blasted with water cannon. This follows on from tensions in May 2011 when PetroVietnam's oil exploration vessels were harassed.

With the race to control the energy rich South China Sea on, Washington has been moving ever closer to Vietnam and even Burma where since 2013 both the US and Britain have been seeking to strengthen military ties and strike lucrative arms deals. This is termed by some as "Investing in Strategic Alignment"

The US is not, as Simon Tisadall claims, 'wary of closer ties' with  Vietnam as it 'must first improve its human rights record'. This is only important in what is known as 'public diplomacy': where vital interests and checking Chinese energy ambitions are concerned human rights are not considered important.

On the contrary, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has lauded the '“tremendous potential” for bilateral defence cooperation, especially between the Vietnamese and US navies with US access to Cam Ranh Bay ,a deepwater port , needed to patrol the sea lanes essential for China's import of oil and gas.

In fact, it is Vietnam that is wary of allowing the US navy full access to its naval facilities. Washington has only refrained from going ahead with full on arms deals because Vietnam has feared that by giving the US Navy full military use of Vietnamese ports, the US could interfere in its domestic affairs.

Cam Ranh Bay was used by the US during the Vietnam War in its struggle against the Vietnamese communists. Hanoi has also had to consider that moving closer to Washington too quickly could precipitate a hostile reaction from its neighbour, an emerging global economic and military superpower.

Vietnam is regarded by Washington as an essential partner in the Asia-Pacific region because of the 'pivot to Asia' strategy. With shale oil giving the US more energy independence from the Middle East, Obama's administration has been able to devise a new strategy for holding China over the barrel as regards oil.

By exercising regional control over the South East China Sea, the US could also block the flow of energy supplies to Chinese economy, one that depends on oil imports from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Oman and Angola. This threat has been countered by the build up of China's navy and quest for oil security.

As Michael Klare puts it,'the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the twenty-first century energy equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail'. With China, Brazil and India rapidly industrialising and the age of easy oil ending, the race is on to control what's left of global fossil fuels.

Klare has referred to a global New Cold War in which military ties and access to energy ( and blocking off the access by other Great Powers ) has triggered off an arms race in Asia that has led to greater tensions, a risk of naval clashes and 'inadvertent escalation', making the region a 'powder keg' waiting to explode.

Across the Asia-Pacific region, the US has attempted to encircle China by building up a neo-imperial alliance with Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Singapore and Thailand to contain China and retain its global hegemony no matter the costs or the risks.

General Sisi as the next Colonel Nasser.

'Sisi has pledged stability as a central plank of the military-led government he will shepherd towards elections in nine months' time, he has also tapped into themes that Nasser used to enshrine his legacy as one of modern Egypt's most celebrated figures.

"Despite 40 years of painting a bad portrait of Abdel Nasser, whenever there are bad times, people always conjure up his image," said a Nasserist activist and leader of a political bloc that champions his tenure. "Sisi has not got the same hold on the Egyptian consciousness. Not yet."

In his public appearances since the 3 July coup, Sisi has mirrored Nasser's key messages of nationalism, scepticism of western intentions, Arab dignity and strong leadership. The latter has been seized on by a broad swath of the Egyptian public that has struggled in the chaos of the revolution that brought down Hosni Mubarak's presidency in January 2011.'

General Sisi is trying to play on his image as another Colonel Nasser who is protecting the Egypt's national interest against the Muslim Brotherhood, a strongman who will resist Western demands and pursue economic policies that benefit 'the majority' of  'the people'.

One continuity is that Sisi follows Nasser in being product of the Military Academy set up by Egypt's first authoritarian reformer Mehemet Ali back in 1811 and which made the army the core of the Egyptian state. But that is, of course, as true of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

Another continuity with the Arab Spring of 2011 is that the 1952 Revolution was followed by two years of political turmoil and squabbling over who got the economic spoils and conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood which was made illegal in January 1954 just as it is being crushed again in 2013.

The big change in 2011-2013, of course, is that the Egyptian army does not contain an overt sympathisers with the Muslim Brotherhood and has not made a revolution whose goals its leaders are arguing over. The Egyptian army exists comfortably in co-existence with the old regime before 2011.

Even so, the 2011 uprising suceeded primarily in only removing Mubarak and in demands for a new constitution agreed by parliament and a president with proper checks on his power. All that has happened is yet another grubby post-revolutionary power feud with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The 1952 was a revolution in that it made Egypt independent of British control removed the monarchy and led Egypt between 1956 and 1970 to depend upon the USSR for aid and military and technical assistance. The complete failure to defeat Israel in the 1967 war only confirmed the failure of the experiment.

Ever since Anwar Sadat moved towards the USA and peace with Israel, the Egyptian army has never again sought to challenge Israel. The military was trained with US help and expertise, under Mubarak's rule too after 1981, to preserve Egypt from 'instability'.

Evidently, General Sisi follows in the footsteps of Sadat and Mubarak. However, despite the 1.3bn funding the US has given to the army since 1979, Egyptian generals have often argued that this is not such a great deal as it once was with increasing prices.

Throughout the 2000s Egypt has started to look towards other powers to provide arms such as Russia and China, leading to Washington upping its arms sales in order to retain its regional influence. Not least when Sino-Egyptian trade has risen throughout the period.

It is not inconceivable that Egypt under another military leader might not try to gain a measure of independence by playing off rival suitors such as the US and China against each other. As for the democracy promised by the Arab Spring, this looks likely to be sacrificed in the interests of  'stability' and security.

For neither the West nor the Gulf States or China are going to take the risk of going against the Egyptian army or what it deems is the proper course for the nation. There are too many lucrative arms deals to lose. None want instability in the largest oil producing regions to the east or disruption on the Suez Canal