Why China Could Stand to Gain from the Coup in Thiland.

The decision to put off any election in Thailand for a period of 15 months by General Prayuth Chan-ocha and to put into effect political 'reforms', that will put an end to the political turmoil that has been going on since 2011, is essentially an attempt to restore the predominant role of the 'monarchy-military nexus'.

The US and EU diplomats expressing 'concern' and demanding elections do so because since the new Pivot to Asia strategy that started in 2010, Washington has tended to back the Shinawatras because they do win elections and because they are allied to pro-US political forces across the border in Cambodia.

The Pivot to Asia is all about containing the military threat posed by China to Washington's regional partners and, in particular its claims to the territorial waters of the South China Sea where there are copious supplies of oil, and the Middle Kingdom's rivalry with the US for influence in South East Asia.

Given that the US and EU tacitly allowed the military in Egypt to launch a coup and gun down protesters in the street, while offering only tokenistic and mealy-mouthed condemnations, the Thai military have had no reason to believe that its coup would meet with effective western opposition.

One reason is that Thailand was a key part of Washington's strategy of containing communism during the Cold War and now of China as it overtakes the US in the wake of the financial crash of 2008 to become the world's largest economy with which Thailand has an increased amount of trade.

Should the US start to withdraw more of its military aid to Thailand, the monarchy-military nexus could always start to draw on Chinese military assistance and pull away from the joint naval cooperation essential to Washington's plan to control the oil tanker routes to China.

China has every interest in a military government in Thailand moving closer to Beijing in order to offset Washington's attempt to secure naval predominance in South East Asia and so be able to use the potential stopping of China's oil imports as a coercive tool of diplomacy.

Beijing has already watched as a traditional ally in Myanmar ( Burma ) has become closer to aligning with Washington, in response to nationalist discontent with Chinese dominance over its mining sector infrastructure projects, and has witnessed the establishment of military ties and prospectively lucrative arms deals.

If China is able to exploit the insecurity the monarchy-military nexus has at the threat of being pushed out of the privileged position they had under US auspices throughout the Cold War and until the first part of the twenty first century, it can thwart part of Washington's Pivot to Asia strategy.

When General Prayuth claims that 'Thais' like me, have probably not been happy for nine years' he is referring to the fact the 2006 coup did not, in the end, defeat the power of the Shinawatra dynasty and also, in effect, the fact that the US has moved closer to them after initially being wary of Thaksin's party.

What the monarchy military nexus want is an authoritarian government and the reduced threat of any attempt to erode their privileges through the Shinawatras mobilisation of the votes of the urban wage earners and rural classes who have seen higher food and energy prices due to dependence on imported oil.

With the impact of climate change causing floods and droughts that have caused havoc to Thai rice yields, both the Shinawatra party and their enemies have seen China as an alternative source of aid and assistance and, in the case of the generals, an example of a prosperous economy without the chaotic democracy.

The Pivot to Asia: Energy Geopolitics and Containing China.

"In recent months, China has undertaken destabilising, unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South China Sea....All nations of the region, including China, have a choice: to unite, and recommit to a stable regional order, or, to walk away from that commitment and risk the peace and security that has benefited millions of people throughout the Asia-Pacific, and billions of people around the world"-Chuck Hagel, United States Secretary of Defense. 

The largest risk to the Asia Pacific region and its security has come about through Washington's pursuit of the Pivot To Asia strategy that started in 2010 and is ultimately aimed at naval dominance of the vital sea routes along which tankers delivering oil to China from the Middle East and Africa.

As the the US has declined as the world's predominant economy relative to China as a consequence of the financial crash of 2008 and two hugely expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has refocused the aim of maintaining global military hegemony to Asia.

After 2011, Obama and Panetta made plain their intent to bolster naval cooperation and increase arms supplies of US military hardware to the Philippines, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and other long standing allies as well as to bring in Myanmar and Vietnam as part of a plan to contain China.

Beijing has become increasingly worried about the plan to encircle China with a ring of regional alliances that threaten to cut of its access to strategically vital raw materials and energy, one reason both China and the US have continued to vie for influence even in Afghanistan.

One unmentionable geostrategic aim of the prolonged presence of US troops in Afghanistan was the construction of the TAPI pipeline, one aimed at uniting Pakistan and India together with a pro-US regime in Kabul in a community of economic interest that would check China's inroads into Central Asia.

Energy geopolitics is the predominant factor behind global power politics in the 21st century. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a unilateral move to control the second largest oil reserves in the world and hem in Iran to the east and to reduce dependence on Saudi Arabia in the days before US shale oil was tapped.

So a reason for China's unilateral thrust to claim the oil off the Paracel Islands is to secure the oil before the US is in the commanding position to threaten its oil supplies. Vietnam, at present, is not a partner of the US but has started to move towards Washington and the prospect of closer naval cooperation.

The New Great Game between the US and China for influence and control over resources has dangerous overtones of the Cold War and the fact that energy hungry Asia Pacific powers are quarrelling over essential supplies of oil in the South China Sea has led to rising nationalism and an arms race.

As regional rival powers such as China and Vietnam modernise their economies at breakneck speed, the tendency for one party regimes is to use nationalism as a means of diverting domestic discontent onto enemies that threaten their access to resources such as oil vital to drive industrialisation and transport.

A crisis over claims over the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea could well trigger off the potential for a US-China clash as the US is treaty bound to support the Philippines is attacked by a third party. This would cause havoc to the global economy as the centre of economic gravity lies in the Asia Pacific region.

The same potential for conflict exists between China and Japan over the what they respectively call the Diaoyus or the Senkakus islands which are disputed in the East China Sea and contain huge reserves of oil off their shores in maritime waters patrolled by both their navies.

It is ultimately the US that is responsible for ratcheting up the tensions by its attempt to hold on to its global dominance by pursuing a geostrategy of holding the Chinese economy to ransom through what Michael Klare terms the twenty-first century energy equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail'.

Thailand 2014 : The Year of Living Dangerously.

The vocal condemnation of the Thai army coup by the West could be a diplomatic mistake as might the US decision to suspend about one third of the aid provided to Thailand. None of it can affect events in Thailand nor determine the outcome of the power struggle for control after King Bhumibol Adulyadej dies.

The willingness of Washington to make a principled stand against a military coup reflects the fact that since 2011, the year of Yingluck Shinawatra's election, the Obama administration has pursued its Pivot To Asia strategy in which Thailand is considered a key regional partner in the quest to contain China.

General Prayuth, the head of the army and leading figure in the 2006 coup, is part of Thailand's 'monarchy-military nexus' which has felt pushed out of influence with the rise of Thaksin's party as it keeps winning elections and has been tacitly supported by the US since 2011

The reason for that is the authoritarian government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the PM from 2008 to 2011, one backed on the streets by the Yellow Shirts, had not proved as pro-US as Washington had hoped after the 2006 coup and raised the prospect of Thailand turning closer to China as a regional partner.

With the dispute between Vietnam and China over the oil and fish of the South China Sea reaching crisis point, Beijing could be posed to exploit the growing rift between the US and the interim coup government to step in to offer arms deals and military aid to the beleaguered monarchy-military nexus.

An authoritarian government in Bangkok dominated by former members of the Democrat Party would be far more congenial to China which has been attempting to cultivate its 'soft power' ties with Bangkok's Sino-Thai business and political elite as a means of rivalling the US for influence.

China has no interest in watching Thailand become closer to Cambodia and Myanmar as part of a coalition of states hostile to China's claims to dominate the South China Sea within the nine dash line just as Thailand and Cambodia have no oil interests at stake in these maritime waters.

By contrast with Washington, Beijing has been mute in response to the coup. Being far more pragmatic, diplomats in Beijing realise that the Thai elites, whether supporters of Thaksin's party or the opposition, would not take kindly to lectures or direct meddling from the West.

The dilemma for Washington now is if tried using punitive sanctions stronger than those after 2006 it could end up pushing whichever faction wrests control after the 2014 coup closer towards Beijing and, in effect, lose a military alliance it has had since the height of the Cold War in the 1950s.

As Ernie Bower of the Center for Strategic and International Studies made plain, “You could lose an alliance and if you don’t lose an alliance, you could in effect lose the primacy of a friendship with one of ASEAN’s anchor countries". Having Myanmar is the US orbit would hardly be compensation.

2014 is going to be a year of living dangerously. Thailand is the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia. But the impact of higher fuel and food prices in an oil import dependent economy is widening social divisions and creating political polarisation between the old elites and the rural masses and urban wage earners.

With the US and China vying for influence, it could be that an authoritarian regime emerging from out of the military coup would be backed by either Great Power, more likely China, and that this, and the reactionary stance of the Sino-Thai elites backing the Yellow Shirts,  could add ethnic enmities to class resentments.

The 2014 Coup in Thailand and the New Great Game in South East Asia.

The Thai military takeover was clearly a coup. Yet Western observers and diplomats are blundering by declaring too openly as did John Kerry in stating “there is no justification for this military coup” . he hinted there would be "negative implications for the U.S.-Thai relationship" and "especially the Thai military.”

The 2006 coup in Thailand was seen as beneficial in some quarters in Washington as during the Cold War the monarchy-military nexus had tended to back the US in South East Asia. However, in the wake of the 2008 financial crash and the USA's relative decline it has become more complicated.

What exactly the coup will mean domestically for Thailand is uncertain but there is an interesting geopolitical context to the unrest. In the post Cold War period, Thailand remained a close ally of the US and was a partner in George Bush's 'Global War on Terror', and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, with the phenomenal growth of China as Asia's or indeed the globe's economic superpower, the US-Thai alliance can no longer be taken for granted. After the coup of 2006, the US put certain sanctions on Thailand and yet it has had no effect on preventing the army interfering in politics.

China would have no qualms in dealing with an authoritarian regime in Bangkok and has attempted to cultivate greater cultural ties especially with the privileged Sino-Thai elite in and around Bangkok who dislike democracy and the threat to their privileges posed by the pro-Thaksin Redshirts.

The coup cannot be officially called a coup in Washington yet because it is not entirely clear if the generals in Bangkok are going to explicitly decide in favour of a government that rejects the democratic mandate given to PM Yingluck Shinawatra or allow fresh elections.

Washington has been divided over whether to back the traditional monarchy-military nexus', supported by the Yellow Shirts, or the pro-Thaksim Redshirts because by backing one or the other too decisively, they could stand to lose political influence to China in the ruling circles of Bangkok .

In practice, under President Obama, Washington has tended to look favourably on Thaksim's side since the Pivot To Asia strategy became the USA's paramount concern in global power politics. One reason is that the government that overthrew Thaksim in the 2006 coup was unpopular and not so pro-US as hoped.

By contrast, Thaksin is seen to represents the the majority of the rural masses and the less privileged in Thailand and is regarded as being an ally of other leaders in neighbouring states such as Hun Sen in Cambodia who had Thaksin as an economic adviser and offered sanctuary to him after the 2006 coup.

As Washington has moved closer to the government of Thaksin's sister ,Yingluck Shinawatra, so as to avert the prospect of Bangkok moving closer to Beijing on issues such as the dispute over the oil and gas in the maritime waters claimed by China, the monarchy-military nexus has been sidelined.

Hence the coup of 2014 could see a reversal of the monarchy-military nexus's previous tendency to lean towards Washington should the US impose sanctions or threaten to suspend military cooperation because China would only be ready to step in to increase joint military exercises and naval patrols with Thailand.

A Congressional Research Service report in 2009 stated "Following the 2006 coup, many US government officials cited fears that China would take advantage of any withdrawal of US military assistance to establish stronger defence relations between Bangkok and Beijing".

The problem for the US is that is denouncing the coup too openly and threatening Thailand with sanctions ( while not calling it a coup ), Washington is going to play into the hands of Beijing which has consistently and increasingly tried to court former allies and opponents of Thaksin's party to gain influence.

Even more ominously, China has attempted 'race-based diplomacy', promoting ties with Thailand's Sino-Thai elites, a number of whom tend to support the monarchy-military nexus and back the Yellow Shirts against the growing strength of the poor, thus adding a potential ethnic dimension to the turmoil.

The absurdly named Thai Democrats led by Abhisit Vejjajiva which represents these elite interests has no interest in parliamentary democracy since it has been unable to win an election since 2001. It's main middle class backers in Bangkok refer to the red shirts as "buffalos", "low class and vile" or else just "trash".

If Thailand remains under military rule, the chances of chronic civil war are likely to be heightened by the competitive New Great Game for influence and regional alliances in South East Asia between China and the US, in which Thailand would be an important linchpin, if order breaks down and widespread conflict ensues.

The Pivot To Asia: China, Vietnam and the New Cold War.

'China's provocative decision to station a $1bn (£600m) deep-sea oil drilling rig in disputed waters 120 miles off Vietnam – well within Hanoi's 200-mile exclusive economic zone, in clear breach of a 2011 bilateral maritime pact and in defiance of regional and international agreements' ( Simon Tisdall, Vietnam's fury at China's expansionism can be traced to a troubled history, Guardian May 15 2014 )

The anti-Chinese riots across Vietnam reflect the upsurge in nationalism in the Far East created by the pathological quest for control over the oil and gas in the South China Sea and China's bid for regional economic and military hegemony in opposition to US designs to thwart these ambitions by .

China has been prepared to back up the CNOOC's drilling off the Paracel Islands with 80 ships to protect the oil rig on its journey against Vietnamese vessels which were rammed and blasted with water cannon. This follows on from tensions in May 2011 when PetroVietnam's oil exploration vessels were harassed.

With the race to control the energy rich South China Sea on, Washington has been moving ever closer to Vietnam and even Burma where since 2013 both the US and Britain have been seeking to strengthen military ties and strike lucrative arms deals. This is termed by some as "Investing in Strategic Alignment"

The US is not, as Simon Tisadall claims, 'wary of closer ties' with  Vietnam as it 'must first improve its human rights record'. This is only important in what is known as 'public diplomacy': where vital interests and checking Chinese energy ambitions are concerned human rights are not considered important.

On the contrary, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has lauded the '“tremendous potential” for bilateral defence cooperation, especially between the Vietnamese and US navies with US access to Cam Ranh Bay ,a deepwater port , needed to patrol the sea lanes essential for China's import of oil and gas.

In fact, it is Vietnam that is wary of allowing the US navy full access to its naval facilities. Washington has only refrained from going ahead with full on arms deals because Vietnam has feared that by giving the US Navy full military use of Vietnamese ports, the US could interfere in its domestic affairs.

Cam Ranh Bay was used by the US during the Vietnam War in its struggle against the Vietnamese communists. Hanoi has also had to consider that moving closer to Washington too quickly could precipitate a hostile reaction from its neighbour, an emerging global economic and military superpower.

Vietnam is regarded by Washington as an essential partner in the Asia-Pacific region because of the 'pivot to Asia' strategy. With shale oil giving the US more energy independence from the Middle East, Obama's administration has been able to devise a new strategy for holding China over the barrel as regards oil.

By exercising regional control over the South East China Sea, the US could also block the flow of energy supplies to Chinese economy, one that depends on oil imports from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Oman and Angola. This threat has been countered by the build up of China's navy and quest for oil security.

As Michael Klare puts it,'the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the twenty-first century energy equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail'. With China, Brazil and India rapidly industrialising and the age of easy oil ending, the race is on to control what's left of global fossil fuels.

Klare has referred to a global New Cold War in which military ties and access to energy ( and blocking off the access by other Great Powers ) has triggered off an arms race in Asia that has led to greater tensions, a risk of naval clashes and 'inadvertent escalation', making the region a 'powder keg' waiting to explode.

Across the Asia-Pacific region, the US has attempted to encircle China by building up a neo-imperial alliance with Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Singapore and Thailand to contain China and retain its global hegemony no matter the costs or the risks.