'War consisteth not in battle only, or the act of
fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle
is sufficiently known'-Thomas Hobbes.
It is possible that the military responded to the Muslim Brotherhood protesters outside the Cairo barracks, killing 51 people, because some in the
crowd were armed and wanted to provoke or panic the army into shooting.
Or else some were determined to give the Muslim Brothers a 'whiff of
grapeshot'.
The military takeover was bound to be resisted by the
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and these killings can only intensify the the
sense of martyrdom that has been used to mobilise them; it has put a
seal of blood on the cause and will commit the Muslim Brotherhood to
continue advocating their people to 'rise up'.
The broad
competing power blocs in Egypt now trying to pose as the legitimate
heirs to the 2011 'revolution'-both the Muslim Brotherhood and those who
supported its removal-have deep antagonistic roots that go back to the
divisions caused by Sadat's 'open door' reforms of the economy in the
1970s.
After 1973 and Israel's victory in another Arab-Israeli
War, Sadat had moved towards making Egypt more closely dependent on the
US instead of the USSR in order to fund its military and economy. The
IMF became involved and its deficit reduction conditions for aid led to
food prices being raised.
The economic conditions were created,
along with rapid urbanisation and growing populations, for the growth of
the Muslim Brotherhood to represent the poorer Egyptians who migrated
to Cairo and the struggling traders shut out of mainstream economic life
by the control exercised by Westernised elites.
Set against that
the way the Muslim Brotherhood had been repressed by Nasser after he
came to power the 1952 with their help, the theme of the betrayal of the
umma by illegitimate usurpers and fake Muslims has been a consistent
one that has now been given added edge.
The irony is that
President Morsi had accepted the close relationship with the US
especially on foreign policy and he was never in a position to challenge
the army's position. Neither were the army not anti-Islamist Egyptians
prepared to give him time to preside over more economic uncertainty and
decay.
For decades the economic model proscribed by the the US
and the IMF has not made for social stability nor an economy not
dependent upon an entrenched elite and bureaucracy from using aid to
bolster their own interests. Infant industries have failed to compete
against allowing Western technological imports.
Now in 2013 there
seems to prospect of Egypt being able to move away from a failing
economy at the very time when its political chaos is deterring
investment and the IMF is imposing condition on aid that involve
austerity measures such as the cutting of fuel subsidies and raising
sales tax on goods.
Despite the fact Morsi backed these measures
to get IMF aid, the collapsing economy is interpreted through 'culture
wars' as Muslim Brotherhood supporters see the entire problem in Egypt
as being the fact that evil corrupt pagans have monopolised the system
for themselves.
The Muslim Brotherhood for a long time has preached that by Islamising society more it can create the conditions
upon which true virtue will flourish and corruption in the way aid is
administered banished and the spread to real wealth to believers assured.
For
his supporters Morsi's removal is an attack on those hopes and his
restoration a precondition for any alleviation of their poverty and
economic deprivation. For those who supported his removal it was seen as
a precondition of any chance to revive tourism, push for open democracy
and restore the economy.
The factors driving civil conflict are
based on deep rooted intractable divisions. Both sides are claiming that
the revolution has been perverted or stolen from them and both regard
the other as counter-revolutionaries prepared to use force and terrorise
the other. So now, perhaps, only power and force can decide the outcome.
The
question is really whether radical Islamists could possibly put up an
armed revolt and what access to weapons they have. There are no signs
that any in the army are prepared to defect to the rival 'revolution'
against which the coup was directed-both in the name of preserving the
gains of 2011 against dictatorship.
Showing posts with label Arab Spring. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab Spring. Show all posts
Tuesday, 9 July 2013
Thursday, 4 July 2013
Egypt 2013: Coup, Revolution or Uprising ?
The events of 2011, which saw President Mubarak removed, and those of the past 48 hours in which the Egyptian army has removed and put the elected President Morsi under arrest have been both classified as 'revolutions' when they are better described as revolts or uprisings that the army exploited to their advantage.
The Egyptian revolts can not amount to a revolution which, by definition, means the total overthrow of the existing political, economic and social order. The overthrow of Mubarak was coordinated by the army in response to the mass demonstrations of 'People Power' in Tahrir Square in Cairo no less that the removal of Morsi.
The difference is that in 2011 the overthrow of Mubarak was broadly the removal of a dictator and the move towards a democratic system of elections. The problem was that the election of President Morsi did not see much of the structure of Mubarak's state dismantled or reformed but being used to promote
If anything, the events of 2011 and the past few days have seen Egypt move towards a position akin to that of Turkey in the past and Latin America where periods of parliamentary rule alternates with military dictatorship and constitutional life continually restored or constantly threatened.
The overthrow of Morsi may well be part of a longer process towards a democratic 'political revolution' that is yet to be completed and that is being driven by events on the streets. Yet the army controls 40% of the Egyptian economy and employs 25% of the workforce.
For there to be a revolution the army would have to completely purge the Egyptian state and civil institutions of Mubarak era hangovers and preside over a period where the state is protected from potential attacks from radicalised Muslim Brotherhood supporters.
Yet the radicals who were prepared to go along with Morsi's more moderate course and the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to take power through the ballot box as opposed to Islamist revolution will now see the army's move as 'counter revolutionary' because Morsi did gain 51% of the Egyptian vote.
Essentially, what there is in Egypt is two conceptions of what revolution really ought to be, one depending on Islamist notions that do not necessarily embrace democracy as much more than a means of enforcing Godly authority, and a secular idea of revolution against that authority and dictatorship.
A clash between the two is set to happen in Cairo and only the army can prevent the potential spiral into violence on the streets between two camps, one already massed in Tahrir Square now departed along with Morsi's departure and the other yet to amass itself in opposition by occupying public spaces in Cairo in protest.
By all accounts the army's intervention has proved popular in Cairo with the protesters which is why news of Morsi's removal was greeted with euphoria-the army is seen as the guarantor of stability against Islamist misrule, incompetence and economic collapse.
It is precisely the instability that is hindering economic recovery and why the Egyptian stock market bounced upwards when news of the army takeover was announced. There has been and will be no 'revolution' but a carefully choreographed managed transition.
Given that Egypt is polarised between the poorer classes and struggling shopkeepers and traders who support Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood and those poorer Egyptians who are against Islamism, the army will try to preside over, if anything, 'top down reform' of the economy and the political system.
The alternative to a period of army rule now that it has effectively been imposed, for right or wrong, is a complete bloodbath. Whether that rule will be gradually used to promote conciliation and pluralistic democracy under controlled circumstances remains to be seen.
The Egyptian revolts can not amount to a revolution which, by definition, means the total overthrow of the existing political, economic and social order. The overthrow of Mubarak was coordinated by the army in response to the mass demonstrations of 'People Power' in Tahrir Square in Cairo no less that the removal of Morsi.
The difference is that in 2011 the overthrow of Mubarak was broadly the removal of a dictator and the move towards a democratic system of elections. The problem was that the election of President Morsi did not see much of the structure of Mubarak's state dismantled or reformed but being used to promote
If anything, the events of 2011 and the past few days have seen Egypt move towards a position akin to that of Turkey in the past and Latin America where periods of parliamentary rule alternates with military dictatorship and constitutional life continually restored or constantly threatened.
The overthrow of Morsi may well be part of a longer process towards a democratic 'political revolution' that is yet to be completed and that is being driven by events on the streets. Yet the army controls 40% of the Egyptian economy and employs 25% of the workforce.
For there to be a revolution the army would have to completely purge the Egyptian state and civil institutions of Mubarak era hangovers and preside over a period where the state is protected from potential attacks from radicalised Muslim Brotherhood supporters.
Yet the radicals who were prepared to go along with Morsi's more moderate course and the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to take power through the ballot box as opposed to Islamist revolution will now see the army's move as 'counter revolutionary' because Morsi did gain 51% of the Egyptian vote.
Essentially, what there is in Egypt is two conceptions of what revolution really ought to be, one depending on Islamist notions that do not necessarily embrace democracy as much more than a means of enforcing Godly authority, and a secular idea of revolution against that authority and dictatorship.
A clash between the two is set to happen in Cairo and only the army can prevent the potential spiral into violence on the streets between two camps, one already massed in Tahrir Square now departed along with Morsi's departure and the other yet to amass itself in opposition by occupying public spaces in Cairo in protest.
By all accounts the army's intervention has proved popular in Cairo with the protesters which is why news of Morsi's removal was greeted with euphoria-the army is seen as the guarantor of stability against Islamist misrule, incompetence and economic collapse.
It is precisely the instability that is hindering economic recovery and why the Egyptian stock market bounced upwards when news of the army takeover was announced. There has been and will be no 'revolution' but a carefully choreographed managed transition.
Given that Egypt is polarised between the poorer classes and struggling shopkeepers and traders who support Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood and those poorer Egyptians who are against Islamism, the army will try to preside over, if anything, 'top down reform' of the economy and the political system.
The alternative to a period of army rule now that it has effectively been imposed, for right or wrong, is a complete bloodbath. Whether that rule will be gradually used to promote conciliation and pluralistic democracy under controlled circumstances remains to be seen.
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