Syrian Crisis: France's Stance and Its Strategic Partnerships.

“I am struck by how eager Great Britain and France appear to be in favour of military action. And I am also mindful of the fact that both of these two powers are former imperialist, colonialist powers in the region.” -former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski

France has been more hawkish over Syria throughout the conflict there than either Britain or even the US. When news of the alleged chemical weapons strike on East Ghouta broke on 21 August, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, was first out calling for a 'reaction with force'.

A continuous stream of the most belligerent rhetoric has emanated from Paris since then, with calls from President Hollande that France was 'ready to punish' Assad to Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault claiming the attack involved a "massive use of chemical agents".

France's knowledge about Syria's chemical weapons stock may come from the fact that in the 1980s it was French pharmaceuticals that were imported for 'dual use purposes'. The French dossier is technically specific about Syrian CW capabilities but adds nothing towards exact responsibility for the attacks.

The 'public diplomacy' behind the dossier is to back up Washington's version on Saturday and John Kerry's rhetoric about 'we know' everything and 'we have assessed'. Indeed France has been more persistent in backing the Syrian opposition than the US as it was responsible for setting up 'Friends of Syria'.

The 'Friends of Syria Group' or 'Friends of the Syrian People Group' was set up in June 2012 by Sarkozy to bolster support for the Syrian National Council and to prepare for a post-Assad government. The aim is 'revolution' but the reality from the French perspective is its national interests.

France is a staunch ally and strategic partner of Saudi Arabia and Qatar both in the Friends of Syria Group and which support militias with arms and money against Assad. French military ties with the oil rich kingdom have put it at the forefront of the push to directly provide weapons to the Syria rebels.

The FT reported on June 21 2013 an analyst close to ruling circles, Jamal Khashoggi, revealing that Saudi Arabia would never let its Persian Gulf rival Iran 'win a victory in Syria' because Assad had had the upper hand until the alleged chemical weapons attack by his regime occurred.

'”Saudi Arabia has to do something now, even if it will do it alone. The goal now must be toppling Bashar, even if the US is not involved. If Saudi Arabia leads the way, Sunni tribes and o ther countries, including France, will eventually join.”

France, concerned that Syrian opposition forces are losing ground, has suggested it is ready to push ahead with increasing the scale of equipment it supplies to the rebels, but it remains coy on what weapons it may be prepared to include.

Officials said this week that Paris had already “ticked the boxes” of materiel it was willing to deliver on a list presented to the Friends of Syria members by the Free Syrian Army. But they declined to say what these included.'

France's defence of Saudi Arabia's policy in Syria so as to check Iran, its main regional geopolitical rival and Shia enemy, is a lucrative and mutually beneficial partnership. On the August 30 news broke of 'a billion euro defence contract with Saudi Arabia to overhaul four frigates and two refuelling ships'.

France's bilateral ties with Qatar, the other main funder of the Islamist militias, brings numerous benefits from Total's stake in the liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) market and the supply of it as an increasing part of the gas energy portfolio for north west Europe via France's EDF group.

France's energy policy is interconnected to geopolitical strategy and competition with Russia and Gazprom for control over the global market for LNG. The volume of Qatari LNG threatens to displace the importance of Russian gas. The proposed Qatar-Turkey pipeline would rival Russian imports and so it backs Assad.

France's interest in energy diversification coincides with many EU states. However, only France ( apart from Britain ) is a military power that can assert those energy security interests in the Middle East. More than that, Qatar invests billions of petrodollars in French real estate and grand projets.

Egypt: A Cockpit of Domestic and International Power Politics.

On the Washington's reaction to the Egyptian coup, Jonathan Steele writes,

'It was taken aback by the anti-Mubarak protests in 2011 and hesitated for days before persuading General Hussein Tantawi, the top military man of the time, to tell Mubarak to resign. It supported Morsi's removal after the event (and perhaps in advance), claiming the army is "restoring democracy" in John Kerry's phrase'.

Is there really any evidence, however, that Washington was not taken by surprise by the coup ? Or plotted it ? The reason that Washington has not cut the funding to the Egyptian military is more because it has to depend on it to preserve 'stability' against any threat from radicalised Islamists that come from the nature of the coup.

The Egyptian military has been armed and trained by the US since the 1979s to protect the state against threats from jihadists, including the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s and 1990s, and secure the Suez Canal, the border with Israel and strong relations with Saudi Arabia.

SCAF knew it could crush the Muslim Brotherhood without Washington being able to do anything to stop it even it it wanted. The overdependence upon oil and Egypt's geostrategic significance to the Western powers, as well as the potential threat of Cairo moving towards closer ties with China, ensure that.

As, unfortunately, do the lucrative multi-billion dollar arms deals that Washington has with Egypt. The $1.3 billion given to the Egyptian military is a form of subsidy to the US arms industry and firms such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics to boost sales, one that 'preserves jobs' and US manufacturing.

However, even if Washington did cut aid, the Egyptian military is a power in its own right and can use revenue from its own vast business empire in Egypt and money from Saudi Arabia to buy weapons in order to preseve 'stability'. Moreover, Egypt bought $800 million in Chinese weapons after 2003 and $600 million from Russia.

Egypt is now the focus of an arms race that is tied to geopolitical rivalry in the oil and gas rich Middle East. Indeed, the US itself has sought in the last decade to boost arms exports to Egypt so that the vital sea route to the Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is maintained against threats.

With China making inroads into Saudi Arabia and developing oil and trade deals, Washington is going to be wary of losing influence should Egypt turn towards the east as well as it has shown signs of doing not only under the old regime but under Morsi as well.

Morsi Lost a Brutal Power Struggle.

Steele goes on to claim of US statesmen that,

'They seem to have forgotten that Mohamed Morsi was elected president by millions of people in a free vote..... Morsi's rhetoric was often crudely partisan but his actions were not so one‑sided or narrow, given that he tried to appease the military by appointing several Mubarak-era technocrats to his cabinet'

Morsi was elected with 51% of the vote in a presidential election against a rival candidate he narrowly beat on a turnout of 43%. This came after the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament was dissolved after the Supreme Court decreed there has been electoral irregularities in Muslim Brotherhood seats.

Essentially, what has happened since the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 is a brutal power struggle between the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood that has sidelined the more secular democrats and liberals and presented Egypt with a choice of either supporting the old regime again or identifying with the 'martyrs'.

The electoral turnouts prior to the coup in elections were dwindling as Egyptians saw they had no real choice. After the People's Assembly was dissolved in June 2012, there seemed to be few safeguards against Morsi's attempt to ram through a constitution that did not have popular support.

Apart, that is, from the Egyptian army which got rid of Morsi and a new constitution that had been approved of just above 60% of voters in a referendum in December 2012 in which only 37% of voters bothered with. No checks and balances on the president's authority has been guaranteed before his election.

By failing to try to rule for all Egyptians and, ironically, by thinking he had put the army on his side ( they retained a direct role in politics even under his new constitution ) at a time of economic collapse which any new government would have faced problems with, Morsi sealed his and his party's fate.

The irony is that the Muslim Brotherhood tried in November 2012 to strip civilian courts such as the SCC of their power while having done nothing to restrain the power of the military courts whose position was actually protected under the new constitution promulgated by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood's failure to restrain the power of the Egyptian military and to end the military trials that Mubarak introduced, precisely because civilian courts were not effective enough in imprisoning Muslim Brotherhood members, will now be used against them.

By failing to work with those who wanted to restain the power of the Egyptian army, while consistely alienating other groups who had participated in the struggle to be rid of Mubarak's dictatorship, the Muslim Brotherhood helped to expedite the rule of the army.

Patrick Cockburn got it right in The Independent ( Egypt on the brink of a new dark age, as the generals close in for the kill )

'Right up to the giant rallies in Egypt on 30 June Morsi believed the mass petition against his rule was "absurd and unconstitutional". He convinced himself, against compelling evidence to the contrary, that the Egyptian armed forces had accepted a subsidiary role so long as their interests were protected. By policies of sustained ineptitude Morsi and the Brotherhood forced together a strange and awkward alliance against themselves of officials from Mubarak's police state, the military establishment, anti-Mubarak leftists and liberals, businessmen, Copts, intelligentsia and even Salafists'

General Sisi as the next Colonel Nasser.

'Sisi has pledged stability as a central plank of the military-led government he will shepherd towards elections in nine months' time, he has also tapped into themes that Nasser used to enshrine his legacy as one of modern Egypt's most celebrated figures.

"Despite 40 years of painting a bad portrait of Abdel Nasser, whenever there are bad times, people always conjure up his image," said a Nasserist activist and leader of a political bloc that champions his tenure. "Sisi has not got the same hold on the Egyptian consciousness. Not yet."

In his public appearances since the 3 July coup, Sisi has mirrored Nasser's key messages of nationalism, scepticism of western intentions, Arab dignity and strong leadership. The latter has been seized on by a broad swath of the Egyptian public that has struggled in the chaos of the revolution that brought down Hosni Mubarak's presidency in January 2011.'

General Sisi is trying to play on his image as another Colonel Nasser who is protecting the Egypt's national interest against the Muslim Brotherhood, a strongman who will resist Western demands and pursue economic policies that benefit 'the majority' of  'the people'.

One continuity is that Sisi follows Nasser in being product of the Military Academy set up by Egypt's first authoritarian reformer Mehemet Ali back in 1811 and which made the army the core of the Egyptian state. But that is, of course, as true of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

Another continuity with the Arab Spring of 2011 is that the 1952 Revolution was followed by two years of political turmoil and squabbling over who got the economic spoils and conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood which was made illegal in January 1954 just as it is being crushed again in 2013.

The big change in 2011-2013, of course, is that the Egyptian army does not contain an overt sympathisers with the Muslim Brotherhood and has not made a revolution whose goals its leaders are arguing over. The Egyptian army exists comfortably in co-existence with the old regime before 2011.

Even so, the 2011 uprising suceeded primarily in only removing Mubarak and in demands for a new constitution agreed by parliament and a president with proper checks on his power. All that has happened is yet another grubby post-revolutionary power feud with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The 1952 was a revolution in that it made Egypt independent of British control removed the monarchy and led Egypt between 1956 and 1970 to depend upon the USSR for aid and military and technical assistance. The complete failure to defeat Israel in the 1967 war only confirmed the failure of the experiment.

Ever since Anwar Sadat moved towards the USA and peace with Israel, the Egyptian army has never again sought to challenge Israel. The military was trained with US help and expertise, under Mubarak's rule too after 1981, to preserve Egypt from 'instability'.

Evidently, General Sisi follows in the footsteps of Sadat and Mubarak. However, despite the 1.3bn funding the US has given to the army since 1979, Egyptian generals have often argued that this is not such a great deal as it once was with increasing prices.

Throughout the 2000s Egypt has started to look towards other powers to provide arms such as Russia and China, leading to Washington upping its arms sales in order to retain its regional influence. Not least when Sino-Egyptian trade has risen throughout the period.

It is not inconceivable that Egypt under another military leader might not try to gain a measure of independence by playing off rival suitors such as the US and China against each other. As for the democracy promised by the Arab Spring, this looks likely to be sacrificed in the interests of  'stability' and security.

For neither the West nor the Gulf States or China are going to take the risk of going against the Egyptian army or what it deems is the proper course for the nation. There are too many lucrative arms deals to lose. None want instability in the largest oil producing regions to the east or disruption on the Suez Canal

Egypt: The New Great Game and Global Arms Race

'The EU's top diplomat...Lady Ashton ( a Labour Peer ) is in Cairo to try to negotiate an unlikely settlement between Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood and the army, but demands and recent behaviour from both sides mean reconciliation is far from likely.'

So reports the Guardian's Patrick Kingsley. Lady Ashton has reported from an undisclosed location after having been escorted there by the Egyptian army that ex-president Morsi is doing 'well', knows what is going on in the world and that she would not comment on her visit as "I was not going to represent his views".

It is hard to see what bargaining power Ashton actually has and whether this is mere 'public diplomacy' to make it appear as though the EU is in the business of 'democracy promotion' as opposed to promoting its business interests over democracy in the name of 'stability'.

The two, business interests and democracy, are not necessarily incompatible. Yet the military takeover is not very likely to promote democracy as the old Mubarak era elites in the 'deep state' are only prepared to tolerate a measure of it provided they can stave off any threats to their hegemony in Egypt.

The only thing Ashton seems to have offered is vacuous platitudes about the need for a "fully inclusive transition process, taking in all political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood". That will impress neither the Muslim Brotherhood not the Egyptian army which is backed directly by Washington.

The reason the US will not remove its $1.3bn funding is that an authoritarian regime is favoured by strategic partners and major suppliers of oil to the US such as Saudi Arabia. The kingdom fears the spread of Muslim Brotherhood ideas in the region and a weak regime in which terrorists can thrive.

Indeed, after Mubarak fell in 2011 and the US switched to supporting a democratic transition in Egypt, Saudi Arabia indicated that it could draw closer to new emerging energy hungry industrial powers such as India and China. This is poses a threat to US hegemony over the Gulf region.

Moreover, Egyptian generals have long indicated that the $1.3 billion US military aid, which has not changed since 1978, is not substantial enough. There has been resistance to the army downscaling its military capacity to act only as a rapid deployment force to defend Western oil interest in the Gulf.

Given Egypt's global geostrategic significance occupying the land bridge between North Africa and the Middle East, and with the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline, the Egyptian military and the 'deep state' have every interest in playing off rival suitors vying for influence in the region.

Ultimately, Washington will not want to sacrifice influence both in Egypt and Saudi Arabia against China's and Russia's attempt to make strategical inroads into the Middle East. There is an arms race now on with both Great Powers which are eager to gain a foothold and diplomatic leverage.

A Congressional Service Report in late 2011 revealed that Egypt purchased $800 million in Chinese weapons since 2003 and $600 million from Russia. That led to the US increasing its sales of weapons to Egypt from $4.5 billion between 2003 and 2007 to $7.8 billion from 2007 to 2011.

Compared to these broader trends and the feared decline of the US as a world empire, the delay in delivering four F-16 fighter jets to Egypt is a mere diplomatic token gesture no less than Lady Ashton's show of concern about the democratic transition being placed back on track through being 'inclusive'.

Egypt is the site of a brutal power struggle in which the army can ramp up the the stakes by executing a military coup in the name of preserving 'stability' . Then, as General Sisi has indicated, the consequent rise of terrorist threats as all the more reason why those interested in regional stability should support it.

These are the realities of the West being far too dependent upon oil and gas to fuel their high octane economies. The EU state's representatives will warble on about human rights and democracy but are always prepared to do that while leaving the real business of energy geopolitics to the US and NATO.

Both in the Middle East and in Central Asia a New Great Game is on between the major powers for control over oil supplies and the pipeline routes that ensure hegemony. Egypt is squarely in the middle of that global contest as is Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, the latter being another pipeline transit state.